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THE RULE OF PRECEDENTS
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Stare decisis et non quieta movere, which may be freely
translated, to abide by precedents and disturb not settled principles, is a doctrine that has been variously referred to as "the rule
of precedents;" "the sheet-anchor of our jurisprudence;" "a will
o' the wisp;" "a moral obligation;" and "the bogie man striding
across the road of progress." It is a characteristic principle of
Anglo-American law, which fundamentally distinguishes it from
the legal systems of Continental Europe, none of which has ever
adopted the maxim.' While knowledge of the precise date
and origin of this far-reaching principle is as hazy as the history
of the beginning of the Hanseatic League, the time may not be
far distant when some scholar will solve the problem. We know
that there was no common law at the time of the Norman Conquest, for in Leges Henriei Primi, which was written about the
year 1118, or roughly half a century after the battle of Hastings,
the compiler mentions three main contemporaneous bodies of
custom, the Mercian law, the Dane law and the West Saxon law.
'Bisschopp, Moderu Roman-Dutch Law (1926) 42 L. Q. REV. 237, 238.
A few civil law jurisdictions outside of Continental Europe have borrowed the
English system of judicial precedents including Scotland, Louisiana and Quebec. Walton, Relationship of Law of France to Law of Scotland (i9o2) 14
JuRiD. REv. 17.
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The subsequently established King's Courts, destined to survive
numerous local courts, by a process of selection, adaptation and
extension, procured a coalescing of these "coutumes" into a nation-wide system and substituted judiciary law for customary
law; which was accomplished so skilfully that the historic fiction
arose that the common law was of immemorial antiquity, and
Magna Carta's phrase "the law of the land" in the 3 9th chapter
of that memorable document, evidences the thoroughness with
which the amalgamatiohi of the "coutumes" had been effected in a
comparatively short period of time. Even then there seems to
have been no recognized doctrine of judicial precedents, for the
famous case of the Prior of Lewes against the Bishop of Ely'
decided in the year 13o4, often erroneously stated to be a case
wherein a precedent was cited, merely contains an assertion by
counsel (Herle) that the judgment to be given would thereafter
be an authority. At the same time it must be recognized that the
writings of Bracton at a time prior to the date of Herle's argument and subsequent to the signing of Magna Carta contain some
400 citations of judicial decisions. Manifestly the discovery of
the origin, shaping and formulation of the maxim Stare decisis
is of more than antiquarian interest, for the indices of textbooks, digests and reports often reveal a confusion of thought
as to its nature, as for example, when they index an illustration
of the doctrine of "the law of the case" or an application of
res judicataunder the heading, "Stare decisis, etc." It goes without saying that those who agree with the judge who looks on the
rule as a sheet-anchor as well as those who despairingly incline
to the opinion of the judge who regards it as a will o' the wisp,
would gladly welcome such a valuable aid towards the composing of their differences. To many people the history of the
rule seems to be that of Topsy, it "just growed."
There seems to be a recent tendency in a few jurisdictions
for courts of last resort to enlarge the working of the maxim
to stare deciso, and to cite the famous case of Beamish v. Beamis h 3 as authority for the proposition that a decision of an ap2

Y. B. 32-33 Edw. I, 30-34 (1304).
H. L. Cas. 274, 338, 344, 349, 353 (1859).
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pellate court is of binding authority upon itself as well as upon all
inferior courts. It is most earnestly submitted that so far as
the feature of self-limitation is concerned such a principle has
no place in American jurisdictions. The rule in the House of
Lords derives its sanction from a peculiarity of the British Constitution whereby law once declared by the House of Lords
can be changed by Act of Parliament alone. It does not apply
to the Privy Council4 . Furthermore the rule is not so inflexible as it sounds, for it does not apply to cases where a
statute has been overlooked,5 nor does it prevent taking cognizance of changes in public policy; so that we see that to some
extent, at least, non quieta movere is still of weight in the House
of Lords and the maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, has
not been discarded entirely. This latter fact is clearly shown by
the case of Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns & Ammunition Co.,6 which changed the pre-existing rule about contracts
in restraint of trade so far as to approve of a contract in worldwide restraint. A glance at the opinions of Lords Herschell,
Watson and Ashbourne, shows that even a series of decisions
based upon grounds of public policy does not have binding authority where changed conditions require harmonious re-adjustment. Courts deal with men as they are and conditions as they
exist and as a matter of justice, fitness and expediency, and sometimes of necessity judicial policies change with change of customs. Recognition of change of environmental facts is a potent
factor in the adjustment of legal principles to modem conditions.
For instance, Chief Justice Taney's revision of the juridical
definition of navigable waters7 was in great part based upon
recognition of the changes effected by the invention and development of mechanical propulsion of ships making it possible for
vessels to be independent of wind and tide and enabling them to.
breast powerful currents. Sometimes a change of manners and
customs occasions conditions wherein justice and convenience
'Kielley v. Carson, 4 Moore P. C. 63, 9I (I842) ; Read v. Bishop of London, [18gz] A. C. 644, 654.
'Tramway Co. v. County Counil, [x898] A. C. 375, 380.
6 [1894] A. C. 535, 547, 553, 558.
"The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1852).
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require that exceptions be engrafted on a general rule of law.
In such a case courts often recognize the alterations effected by
social changes and give effect to them; as in the leading case of
Corbett v. Poelnitz,8 where the court decided that under the
then novel device of separation agreements, a married woman's
incapacity to contract would not be available to her as a defense
to an action of contract where she was living apart from her husband under an agreement of separation. This recognition of
social change is particularly noticeable in the law of status, which
was practically revolutionized in a generation.
In this connection it is surmised that much of the difficulty and confusion
which arose in the early development of the law of employer and
employee might have been avoided by a prompt recognition of the
environmental social and industrial changes occasioned by the
inauguration of an industrial era, instead of trying to pour new
wine into old bottles by treating the new status as though it were
that of master and servant.
There is now a marked tendency in a school of writers on
legal questions to lay especial stress upon "economic law," and
other social phenomena. One recent critic asserting that a distinguished court had shown "ignorance of economic law,"-a
rather ambiguous statement if wrested from its context, for, of
course, what was meant was a supposed failure to take judicial
notice of a matter of economic fact, or what used to be known as
a principle of political economy. While undoubtedly the courts
of today are willing to take cognizance of well attested facts,
they are mindful of the risk of adopting ephemeral theories of
economics or sociology, and many observers will not agree with
the opinion of the brilliant writer on social psychology that the
law is fossiliferous. This open-mindedness in appellate courts
has been especially noticeable in dealing with questions of constitutional law, an "observational science" in which courts study
the logic of events. Thus the case of People v. Wilian&s10 in,
which a unanimous court decared unconstitutional a statute prosi Durn. & E. 5 (Eng. 1785).
9
F. G. MaKean, Jr., A
10189 N. Y.' 131, 81 N.

Useful Maxim (1926) 4 N. CAR. L. REv. 118.
E. 141

(19OW).
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hibiting night work for women as a denial to women of equal
rights with men, was overruled by the decision of People v,
CharlesSchweinler Press" on consideration of facts found by the
State legislature. No less willingness to change a decision predicated upon assumptions as to facts was shown by the Supreme
Court of the United States when it modified the doctrine of
Lochner v. New York 12 in the leading case of Bunting v. Oregon, 13 which affirmed the constitutionality of an hours of labor
statute. This willingness of our American courts of last resort
to recognize change of environmental facts has been so marked
throughout the course of their history that a great lawyer and
famous teacher and text-book writer is said to have remarked
that "constitutional law is not a system of law." The adaptability
of American constitutions to modern conditions has been finely
phrased by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the following
language:
"Where there is no express Constitutional command or
prohibition, but only general language or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the time of the Constitution's adoption must have their due weight; but the
changed social, economic, and governmental conditions and
ideals of the time, as well as the problems which the changes
have produced, must also logically enter into the consideration, and become influential factors in the settlement of
problems of construction and interpretation." 14
The vexed question whether judges declare law or make it,
reminds the average lawyer of the ancient allegory of the shield
which was gold on one side and silver on the other. Those who
contend that judges make and do not declare law will concede
that the opposite theory has been a potent influence in legal development manifesting itself, for instance, in the oft-quoted
maxim Jus dicere et non fus dare, and frequently revealed by the
declarations of judges that they will travel super antiquas vias.
21214

N. Y. 395, lo8 N. E. 639 (1915).

I98 U. S. 45, 64 (1905).
1243

U. S. 426 (1917).

Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 349, 350, 133 N. W.

(igii).

209, 215, 216
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On the other hand even extreme adherents of the declaratory
school must admit that decisions void of precedent often make
law. A persistent factor at all times in the growth of law has
been the feeling that it is something to be arrived at by discovery and research. Even the compiler of the Code of Hammurabi attributed his work to a revelation from the god Shamash.
Mr. Jenks in his fascinating work, "Law and Politics in the
Middle Ages," 15 cites a passage in Schmid's "Gesetze der Angelsachsen"'16 showing how the question whether the children of a
deceased child should have a share in the estate of their deceased grandfather together with their uncles was settled under
Otto the Great. It was felt that neither enactment nor custom
covered the case, that ordinary human agencies were inadequate
to solve the problem, and- therefore the ruler, as chief magistrate, ordered a battle by champions. 1 7 In common law jurisdictions the judge in deciding a case does not ask himself what
rule he shall formulate but what existing rules and principles are
applicable to the problem placed before him for solution. If his
is a court of first instance, or an intermediate tribunal, he seeks
first for the most recent case on all fours which has been decided
by the appellate court of his jurisdiction, and if there be found
a pertinent precedent therein, it is binding upon him.' s He is thus
restricted because appellate courts exist to ensure uniformity of
decision in their respective jurisdictions. If there be no precedent,
it may be deemed that such fact is a conclusive answer to a contention set forth by a party litigant;1' but ordinarily, in such a
case, some established maxim or principle of the local system
will be followed or a solution borrowed from some other jurisdic'At p. 9.
"At p. 5oo.
IA
curious parallel to this appeal to a court of arms is the way in which
the question of Secession with its background of South Carolina Nullification
and the Hartford Convention, and of numerous arguments adduced in its favor
East of the Hudson as well as South of the Potomac, was definitely settled
by the conflict which waged from the bombardment of Fort Sumter to the
surrender at Appomatox.
18Hill v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 539, 588, 55 S. E. 854, 871 (19o6) ; Caples V.
State, 3 Okla. Cr. 72, 1o4 Pac. 493 (igog); Bernard v. Monongahela Natural
Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 8oi (i9o7).
Mirehouse v. Rennell, 8 Bing. 490, 542 (Eng. 1832).
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tion or legal system, care being taken to ensure that the selected
material be such as harmonizes with the general law, maxims,
customs and usages of the jurisdiction into which it is introduced. If a prior decision of his own court be cited, the obligation to follow it varies according to circumstances. For example,
an uncontested proceeding, consent decree or an ex parte action
does not carry much weight, while on the other hand a wellcontested suit, especially a test case in which real and substantial conflicts of interests have been disposed of, (particularly
where the community has acquiesced in the results and governed
itself accordingly), should not be overruled except for very
cogent reasons, such as oversight of a statute or failure to
observe some requirement of constitutional law. As it is difficult
to change a rule of property, except by legislative enactment,
without unsettling titles, the safest course would be for a lower
court, even though it disapprove of its doctrine, to abide by the
rule it has previously followed and leave its alteration to the
highest appellate court of the jurisdiction. This for a twofold reason: first, to settle the matter in the Federal courts
which follow a "rule of property" as established by the highest
court of a state even on common law principles ;20 and secondly
to have the comforting feeling that if it clearly appears that the
rule is harmful and unjust or opposed to good business practice
it will be reversed, and such reversal take effect not only in the
district from which the appeal shall have been taken, but throughout the entire state. When all is said and done, even an appellate
court is very reluctant to change a rule of property. 21 While not
within fhe purview of the I 4 th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, 2 2 the tendency is to change only such judicial rules
of property as would be constitutional if enacted by a legislature
with retrospective effect; thus expediency no less than the moral
force of the principle stare decisis inclines courts to abide by
" Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418 (U. S. 1863).
of Commissioners v. AIlman, i42 Ind. 573, 42 N. E. 2o6 (1895);
Kirby v. Boyette, 118 N. C. 244, 24 S. E. 18 (1896) ; Struthers v. Railway, 87
Pa. 282 (1878) ; Reed v. Geddes, 287 Pa. 274, 135 At. 232 (1926) ; Mclnnis v.
Lyman, 62 Wis. 191, 22 N. W. 405 (1885); State v. Sutherland, 66 Wis. 5I1,
166 N. W. 14 (1918) ; Read v. Bishop of London, supra note 4.
"O'Niell v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 242 U. S. 2o (1916).
'Board
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precedent in such cases. Of course changes affecting contingent
interests and expectancies and which do not disturb vested rights
will be unhesitatingly corrected. In addition, courts will overrule
palpably unreasonable or mischievous precedents regardless of the
question of "rules of property." 23 It is hardly necessary to
labor the point that precedents and rules of construction have
considerably less weight in the interpretation of wills than in
the construction of other writings such as deeds and leases which
owing to statutory requirements or customary usage are more
uniform. 24 Sir William Jones's frequently quoted jest that "no
will has a brother," has been turned to earnest by decisions that
the same words may express different intentions according to
context or attending circumstances.2 5 Some scriveners try to
avoid this difficulty by inserting an explanatory clause, "Hereby
intending, etc."
Another wide class of cases in which courts hesitate to
overrule precedents arises where contracts have been made in
reliance upon a decision. While a change of decision in such
a case does not deprive of property without due process of law
within the meaning of the i4th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States,2" nor constitute an impairment of a contract within the accepted interpretations of Section io, Article I,
of the Federal Constitution ;27 still a court generally deems it
advisable to abide by a decision upon the faith of which solemn
agreements have been entered into. It has even been held in
some jurisdictions that a state court has no power to impair the
obligations of an existing contract by a change of decision ;28 thus
"Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246 (1855); Rumsey v. Railroad Co., 133
N. Y. 79, 30 N. E. 654 (1892) ; Ray v. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576, 20 At.

io65 (i890.

" Colton v. Colton, I27 U. S. 3oo (i888); Bergman v. Arnhold, 242 Ill.
218, 89 N. E. iooo (i9o9) ; In re Griffith's Will, 172 Wis. 630, 179 N. W. 768
(i92o).
'Fidelity Trust Co. v. Bobloski, 228 Pa. 52, 76 AUt. 720 (1gIo).
Central Land Co. v. Laidley, i59 U. S. 103 (894); Milwaukee Electric
Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. ioo (I9oo).

'Cross

Lake Club v. Louisiana,

of Cleveland, 235 U. S. 50 (914);

224

U. S. 632 (1912); Railroad v. City

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444

(924).
'Harmon v. Auditor, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. I6i (1887) ; Haskett v. Maxey,
134 Ind. 182, 33 N. E. 358 (893).
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assimilating rules of decision to statutes; but in general, the question of overruling precedents in contract as in property law, is
pre-eminently a matter for the exercise of sound judicial discretion. It follows from these considerations that the principle of
stare decisis has obligatory force in the case of a rule which has
been effective for many years and upon whose basis commercial
business has been transacted.

29

Precedents are generally followed unless the injury done by
them is so great as to demand their reversal;40 and provided
also that greater wrong and injury be not inflicted by a change
of decision. 31 If the balance of public or social convenience
requires that an erroneous series of precedents be given binding authority, the principle communis error facit jus becomes
effective,3 2 and as "the law will rather suffer a particular mischief than a general inconvenience," 33 the merits of a particular
case in which the question of following or reversing a series
of precedents may.arise, would not outweigh considerations of
public policy in forgetfulness of the danger that hard cases have
a tendency to make bad law. Courts have no power to abolish
any established principle ;34 such as the unenforceability of a
contract to tempt a man to transgress the laxw, 35 and the duty to
utilize the delegated powers conferred by that "perennial fountain
of justice" 30 and source of much of the law of contracts, quasicontracts, torts and quasi-torts-the Statute of Westminster 11.
Even the tremendous prestige of Lord Mansfield could not prevail to the extent of abolishing the doctrine of consideration in
Bank v. Railway Co., 157 Cal. 573, io8 Pac. 676 (I9IO).
" Paul v. Davis, ioo Ind. 422 (1884); Hill v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 539,
55 S. E. 854 (i9o6); Kelley v. Rhodes, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593 (1898).
"Calhoun Mining Co. v. Ajax Mining Co., 27 Colo. 1, 59 Pac. 607 (Igoo);
McEvoy v. City of Saulte Ste. Marie, 136 Mich. 172, 98 N. W. ioo6 (1904);
City of Wahoo v. Nethaway, 73 Neb. 54, 1O2 N. W. 86 (i9o5).
I2Kirby v. Boyette, 118 N. C. 244, 24 S. E. i8 (1896) ; Callender v. Life
Insurance Co., 23 Pa. 471 (1854).
"Cox v. Rolt, 2 Wils. K. B. 253 (Eng. 1764).
Aud v. Magruder, io Cal. 282 (1859); Paul v. Davis, ioo Id. 422
(1884); Francis v. Telegraph CO. 58 Mi. 252, 59 N. W. 1O78 (1894) ; DicEy,
L~&w & OPINION ix ENGLAND ?1I914) 488.
" Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. K. B. 341, 349 (Eng. 1767).
'Ames, Law and Morals, (1908) 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 107.
"National
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a branch of the law of contracts. Where, however, the tooth
of time and the buffetings of experience have proved the unreliability of a rule, it should be abolished, as in the case of the
misleading fiction that every man is presumed to know the law,
founded in great part upon repeated references to an overruled
argument of counsel on the losing part of a reported case. 87
But after all, rules of law, like maxims, are a species of legal
short-hand (to borrow Sir John Salmond's illuminating phrase),
and even when couched in terms of the absolute are mostly
relative. When a rule satisfies the feeling of legal right (the
Rechtsgefuhl of Dr. von Jhering), courts do not delve deeper.
Where, however, a court is not satisfied with the apparent doctrine of a rule seemingly in point, it endeavors to shake off
the kind of hypnosis induced by catch words and rhythmic phrases
intended to be the equivalent of approved statements of legal
doctrine, and which sometimes appear in syllabus or digest and
text-book, find a place in a plausible brief appeal to a busy trial
court and run their course until experience demands their restatement. A revision is bound to come sooner or later, in such
cases, for even a long series of decisions does not always cause
an unsound doctrine to stand.3 Again, -a decision concededly
correct in its results is not, for that reason alone, to be taken as
a complete statement of an abstract proposition, without limitation or restriction, when applied to a case differing in its state
of facts.8" Nor is a case necessarily binding or persuasive authority for a proposition which appears to follow logically from
40

it.

37F.
G. McKean, Jr., The Presuimption of Legal Knowledge (1927) 12
ST. Louis L. REv. 96. The above-mentioned presumption, often mistaken as an
equivalent and interchangeable phrase for the maxim ignorantia legis neminem
excusat, has been unequivocally rejected in the land of its birth and in at least
two American jurisdictions.
"Barden v. Railroad, 154 U. S. 288, 322 (1894) ; Mason v. Nelson Cotton
Co., 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625 (19o8); Rumsey v. Railroad, 133 N. Y. 79,
3o N. E. 654 (1892) ; Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio 71 (1856); PoI.ocx, THE

GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW

(1912)

113;

LIEBm,

HERMANEUTICS

(Ham-

mond's ed. i88o) 209.
Holcombe v. Bonnell, 32 Mich. 6 (1875); Quinn v. Leathem [i9Ol]
A. C. 495.
0
6 Quinn v. Leathem, supra note 39; HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881)
36.
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Many reams have been written about that lineal descendant
of Swift v. Tyson, the much discussed case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque.41 As finally explained in the case of Tidal Oil Co. v.
Flanagan,42 the doctrine seems to amount to this: That where.
municipal or county bonds or some other form of 'contracts have
been declared valid by the Supreme Court of their state, prior
to their issue, and such validity has been denied by the same
court after their issue or making, Federal courts, where they have
jurisdiction to decide as to the validity of such securities under
the diversity of citizenship clause of the United States Constitution, will feel themselves entirely free to rule on the subject; but where the question arises on an appeal from the
state courts to the United State Supreme Court, the last de-.
cision of the highest state court will be followed.
The general subject of torts reminds one of Chief Justice
Willes' reported dictum that the common-law consists of statutes
worn out by time for, as pointed out by many writers, the greater
part of the law on the subject has developed under the sanction
of the Statute of Westminster 11.4 3 The topic -is a complex
and intricate subject upon which it is difficult to generalize. First
and foremost, however, it may be conceded that no precedent or
series of precedents is binding where fundamental principles have
been ignored or overlooked. Next there is the consideration that
the law leans against the invention or creation of rights of
44
action, opposed to which is the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium.
There is probably no branch of law which is more affected by
environmental facts than that which has to do with private
wrongs. Social, economic and industrial changes and conditions, the public policy and felt necessities of the time all play
their part. Even change of public opinion has a recognized influence. As no man has a vested right to do wrong, precedents
per se have less weight in the law of torts than in that of con1 Wall.

175 (U. S. 1864). For a most interesting discussion, see
ESSAYS (1923 ed.) 15o, 151.
"263 U. S. 444 (924).
' (1284) WESTMINSTER II (13 Edv. I), c. 24.
i

LaG.

41Western

TNAYER,

Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L. R.

9 Ex. 218 (1874).
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tracts and property. New applications of tort principles constantly arise, and commentators are kept busy revising categories
and seeking names for newly discovered species of torts.
Many varieties of torts have received their first recognition
4
within the memory of people now living. Lumley v. Gye, 5
establishing that procurement of a breach of contract constitutes a tort; Western Counties 1fanure Co., v. The Lawes
Chemical Manure Co., 6 formulating a rule that disparagement
of goods is a tort; Zielitzki v. Obadisk,4 7 laying down the rule
that negligent dissemination of falsehood resulting in nervous
injury is actionable; are a few of many instances of recognition
of torts not to be found in the older books of the law. Much of
the subject consists of conclusions of fact termed presumptions
of law for the reason that they are not within the purview of a
jury. Numerous acts which, in times past, have been considered
phases of the principle damnum absque injuria have been subsequently recognized as torts in the light of newly discovered facts
or upon new analysis of the subject-matter. Thus engaging
in business for the sole purpose of wrecking a man's means of
livelihood without justification or excuse is now recognized as
a tort.4s The rule in Acton v. Blundell,49 which still has an unsettling influence in many jurisdictions, that interference with
waters in subterranean courses is damnum absque injuria, has
been discarded in the case of Collins v. Chartiers Gas Co., 5°
wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania speaking through
Mr. Justice Mitchell, took judicial notice of the advance of geological knowledge of subterranean conditions making it possible
to avoid disturbing a neighbor's property values, and made interference with such rights a tort, saying, inter alia, "If the
boundaries of knowledge have been so enlarged as to make an
end of the reason, then, cessante ratione cessat ipse lex.-" Among
452

El. & BI. 216 (Eng. 1853).
note 44.
3 West. Wkly. 229 (Can. 1921).
v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 11g N. W. 946 (1gog).
& W. 324, 353 (Eng. 1843).

"Supra
, [1921]
4
sTuttle
49 12 M.

so131 Pa. 143, 159, 18 AtI.

1012, 113

(18go).
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other classes of torts which may be expected to obtain judicial
recognition in the future are acts once deemed harmless but since
found to be injurious to public health and ascertained to be a
cause of personal injury. Some anomalous phases of the doctrine of imputed negligence may be changed in the direction of
abolishing legal responsibility without personal fault, as has already been done in Wisconsin where, in the case of Chase v.
American Cartage Co.,51 it was decided that a rule of imputed
contributory negligence could lawfully be changed by a court
of last resort. Tort liability without fault, more often of statutory rather than common law origin, has been frequently dealt
with by commentators as quasi-delict or an anomaly. Generally
speaking it arises in cases where there is ownership, possession or
control of an agency with potentialities for doing harm. As a
matter of business practice such liability is customarily guarded
against by insurance. Prior to the era of machinery, it had so
narrow a scope that instances of its application could be enumerated in a very short paragraph. At the time of the first enactment of Workmen's Compensation Acts, many members of the
legal profession were doubtful as to the constitutionality and
fairness of such legislation, but these doubts have been dispelled.
The case of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,5 2 in which the ju-

diciary of New York unequivocally overruled a prior decision
that such legislation was unconstitutional, is a handsome illustration of the alacrity with which the courts of today will admit
and correct judicial error. "New occasions teach new duties,"
which constantly lead to a modification of ancient formulas in
the law of torts even where such formulas have been recognized
in a flood of precedents. Revision of theory also leads to unhesitating reversal of long series of decisions, as in the case of
Citizens Life Insurance Co., v. Brown53 which discountenanced
the theory that malice can not be applied to corporations and
therefore that they cannot be guilty of libel, and held that libels
published in the course of his employment by an officer or agent
51176 Wis. 235, I86 N. W. 598 (1922).
S'2I5 N. Y. 514, iog N. E. 6oo (1915).
[19o4] A. C. 423 (i9o4).
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of a corporation are answerable for by the company on the principle of agency.
There is little that is stereotyped about rascality, consequently new forms of old crimes and new crimes arise from
generation to generation. Except where checked by statute or
fundamental law, courts of common law frequently avail themselves of categories within which to include acts which are opposed to current ethical standards. "All such crimes as especially affect public society are indictable at common law. The
test is not whether precedents can be found in the books, but
whether they injuriously affect the public policy and economy." 54
The principle embodied in the phrase contra bonos mores has
been far-reaching in the development of criminal law and was
undoubtedly a potent factor in impelling the court in the case
of Coinmonwealth v. Randolph 55 to decide that solicitation to
commit murder was a crime, although such decision was absolutely devoid of local precedent. There is no vested right in
erroneous precedents in criminal law56 and it is submitted that
in cases which are contra bonos mores adherence to settled
principles is much more important than a perfunctory following of precedent. The ratio legis of crimes mala in. se, to use a
phrase which it has been a passing fad for some writers to
ridicule, is, it is conceived, of almost overwhelming importance,
and again, principle should not be overridden by precedent. On
the other hand, if these views be correct, in dealing with offences
merely mala prohibita, the rule would be to adhere more closely
to precedent, for stare decisis should protect those whose alleged
infractions of statutes which do not involve moral turpitude,
and which have previously been solemnly decided to be lawful.
It is difficult to agree with the view sometimes taken that an
erroneous interpretation of a criminal statute upon a matter involving moral turpitude, which error furnishes a loophole opposed to the public interest, should be adhered to as a "rule of
MCommonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397, 410 (1881).
146 Pa. 83, 23 Ad. 388 (1892).
State v. Mathews, i43 Tenn. 463, 226 S. W. 2o3 (192o).
ple v. Tomkins, I86 N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326 (I9O6).
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liberty," and that the principle stare decisis supports such a position" -- here as in many other interpretations of the function
of the rule of precedents, the concluding phrase et non quieta
movere seems to have been lost sight- of. Leaving aside the
question of the constitutionality of such a stand, which results
in nullification by admitted misconstruction of valid legislation,
the policy of such an attitude seems very doubtful, although the
present writer has observed that at least one jurist has expressed
approval of the case just referred to and, in addition, such approval seems to be supported by the views of some writers to
whom the retrospective character of a changed decision looms
large as a Brocken shadow. Retrbspective law as such, even
retrospective statutory law, is far from being unknown to American jurisprudence;58 and assuredly there would be a marked
tendency for judiciary law to block, were courts to yield unreservedly to the views of writers who object to tribunals correcting their decisions wherever such correction would be retrospective in its effect. It has been said by a number of such
critics that in such cases correction should be left to the legislature, but it is submitted that it would be irksome and unreasonable, if not impossible, to expect that body to examine and
correct errors in judicial opinions; at the same time, there is this
much to be urged in favor of the objections to judiciary correction of priQr error that if the correction of a legal flaw, while
highly desirable, would be likely to have a disturbing and harmful effect, there is enough public spirit in bar associations to
assure that the matter would be brought to the attention of
"People v. Tomkins, supra note 56.
"Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798); Railroad v. Nesbit, io How.
395, 401 (U. S. 1850); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U. S. 380, 412 (1882);

Gross v. Mortgage Co., 1o8 U. S. 477 (1883); Elwell v. Daggs, 1O8 U. S.

143 (1883); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885); League v. Texas, 184
U. S. 156 (igoi) ; Luria v. United States, 231 U S. 9, 26 (1913) ; Brushaber
v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S. 1 (i916); Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260
U. S.647 (1923); Paul v. Davis, ioo Ind. 422 (1884); State v. New Orleans,
32 La. Ann. 7o9 (188o); Hewitt v. Wilcox, i Metc. 154 (Mass. 184o); Washburn v. Franklin, 24 How. Pr. 515 (N. Y. 1861); Brearley School v. Ward,
201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. lOOl (1911) ; Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 1I5 Misc.
Rep. 257, 187 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1921) ; Lewis v . McElvain, 16 Ohio St. 347
(1847) ; Marsh v. Nelson, lOl Pa. 5I (1882); Bates v. Callum, 177 Pa. 633,
35 Atl. 861 (1896).
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the proper legislative body for appropriate action. The maxim
stare decisis, etc., does not appear to have very great weight in
the law of evidence and procedure, as a general rule. 59 Comparatively little adjective law is of much antiquity, and a great
deal of the learning on the subject which was extant when the
United States Supreme Court commenced business by adopting
the practice of the Courts of Kings Bench and Chancery, is as
obsolete, for all practical purposes, as the flint-lock musket. "The
dead hand of the common law rule of 1789 should no longer be
applied," is the outspoken doctrine of Rosen v. United States,60
in abolishing the old rule of the disqualification of witnesses convicted of crime; and, in general, "as all rules of procedure are
intended to secure the administration of justice in an orderly
manner, it does not seem reasonable that a rule of procedure
should be observed where it is apparent that a strict adherence
thereto will work injustice." 61 This means that courts will
relax or modify a rule of procedure, or even of evidence in order
to prevent injustice, no matter how long the practice may have
been observed. 62 In other words they will treat such rules as
directory rather than mandatory, adherence to first principles
rather than blind following of precedents being the prime consideration. Furthermore, when the existence of a right is once
established, even in a case without precedent, a court will adapt
a suitable remedy wherever possible. 63 The modern trend is
for courts to restate adjective law in accordance with the public
policy of the time, the balance of public or social advantage, and
in compliance with the teachings of experience "which is the
life of the law." Rules of procedure are in a measure traffic
regulations for the guidance of actual controversies, and the increasing pressure of social necessity requires reasonable order,
'Daniels v. State, 2 Penn. 586, 48 At. 196 (Del. igoi); Wetzstein v.
Mining Co., 25 Mont. 135, 63 Pac. 1043 (igoi); Commonwealth v. Lehigh
Valley R_. R-, 165 Pa. 162, 3o AtI. 836 (1895); McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285
Pa. 561, 572, 132 Ati. 8io, 814 (1926).

U. S. 467 (1918).
'Ransom v. City of Pierre, ioi Fed. 300, 310 (C. C. A. 8th, igoo).
'Simkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125, 27 S. E. 361 (1897) ; Baker v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137, 22 N. W. 141 (1885).
'Birkley v. Prosgrave, i East 22o (Eng. i8oi).
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certainty and celerity in the conduct of legal business, consistent
with adaptability to pressing needs and the demands of justice.
This is predicated upon careful observance of the procedural requirements of court and legislature upon the part of parties
litigant, for as President Coolidge has well expressed it, "justice
delayed is justice denied;" consequently lax or slovenly pleading
and disregard of prescribed methods or forms devised to facilitate litigation is a palpable wrong in the delay caused to those
who may be awaiting an opportunity of having their day in
court.
Many metaphors have been employed by legists in describing the development of law. "Legal chemistry," "legal architecture," and a "coral reef," are only a few. Taking it all in
all, the history of our law has shown its unfolding to be "line
upon line, line upon line; precept upon precept, precept upon
precept; here a little, there a little." Perhaps no better statement of the conscious aim of the jurists of our legal system can
be found, than by employing the neat phraseology of the great
scholar and theologian whose published sayings show familiarity
with the legal system of the great empire of which he was a
citizen. "Prove all things, bold fast to that which is good."

